We examine how keiretsu-related institutional investors behave in the Japanese stock market relative to other investor categories for the period from 1985-1998. Based on the agency problem hypothesis for the general bias of institutional investors and the relational distance hypothesis for the unusual bias of keiretsu-affiliated money managers, this paper finds that keiretsu-affiliated money managers over-invest not only in large firms, but also in imprudent firms. The group affiliation of Japanese domestic money managers may drive their portfolio decisions towards financially weak group member firms at the expense of their client investors. Identifying the conditions for this rescue type of investment, we illustrate a rather weak corporate governance foundation of institutional money management in Japan.
Introduction

This paper investigates an interesting question: Under what condition do keiretsu-affiliated
domestic institutional money management agents change their investment style? The possible spectrum of their investment ranges from the style of a purely prudent money manager like a foreign portfolio investor to that of a corporate cross-holding shareholder. We first compare the behavior of Japanese money managers with that of foreign investors using the market portfolio as an unbiased benchmark. Next, similar to the study by Bennet, Sias, and Starks (2003) for U.S. institutions, we break down the domestic institutional investor group into three sub-categories: pension funds, investment trust (mutual) funds, and others.
1 The third sub-category represents the least transparent out of the three. The Japanese institutional management practice may be different internationally because of the existence of keiretsu-affiliated money managers and because of less transparent funds managed by them. We also compare investment bias among the three sub-categories and identify any condition in which keiretsu-affiliated agents change from a prudent manager to a cross-holding shareholder.
The ownership percentage of the domestic institutional investor group ranged between 23 percent and 31 percent, peaking in 1989 (Table 1) during the bubble and the post-bubble period in Japan. The total percentage ownership of more professionally managed groups (i.e., pension and mutual funds) was relatively small in Japan, at 2.4 percent in 1985 and 7.2 percent in 1999. The remaining "others" consist of the special trust accounts managed by trust banks, mostly with a Japanese brand. Our analysis focuses on corporate governance of institutional money management and finds that the others sub-category over-invests in keiretsu-affiliated firms in trouble.
[ Table 1 about here] 1 Bennet, Sias and Starks (2003) differently classify the U.S. institutional investor group into five sub-categories.
While the behavior of foreign investors is interesting to study, we mainly use it as the most prudent benchmark against which the investment bias of the domestic institutional investor categories is compared. Foreign investors have substantially increased their presence in Japan. 2 The group was the third largest consisting mostly of large global investors with full money management capacities in their home countries (Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes, 2001) . 3 Bennet, Sias and Starks (2003) and Sias, Starks and Titman (2006) , among many, investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns. In an international context, Kamesaka, Nofsinger and Kawakita (2003) find that foreign investors use information-based positive feedback trading for higher returns than other classes of investors in Japan. Kim and Nofsinger (2005) document that Japanese institutional investors herd less than the U.S. counterpart does, but the impact of institutional herding is much stronger on stock prices than found in the U.S., especially for keiretsu-affiliated firms. Karolyi (2002) find evidence of positive-feedback trading by foreign investors in Japan, while domestic institutional investors were aggressive contrarians during the Asian financial crisis. These institutional herding patterns are also supported by Iihara, Kato and Tokunaga (2001) for other periods than the crisis. Thus, there is some evidence that Japanese institutional investors increase their investment when firms decrease the market value. Unfortunately, these previous studies on Japanese institutions do not distinguish flows caused by relational investments and those caused by pure portfolio reformation, with much limited use of firm characteristics for herding. As a result, few corporate governance implications are drawn from their results.
We indeed find that domestic institutional investors over-invest in imprudent firms. The imprudent investment of domestic institutional investors is a strong contrast with the international evidence that institutional investors basically over-invest in firms with more prudent characteristics (Del Guercio, 1996 and Falkenstein, 1996) . With the keiretsu and main bank guards extended through money management, some of zombie firms can still survive at the expense of client investors in Japan.
We thus intend to illustrate another pathological issue of keiretsu.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the possible influences of investor familiarity and agency issues in money management and the effect of relational distance between money managers and firms in a Japanese corporate governance context. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 documents the ownership cross-section of foreign as well as Japanese domestic investors. Section 5 addresses corporate (mis)governance by relating various measurements of a keiretsu-affiliated manager's distance from firms to their investment bias. Section 6 concludes.
Hypotheses
Information and Agency Problems
The first set of hypotheses in this paper relies on a feature of money management common to both foreign and domestic institutional investors: the principal-agent problem between money managers and their client investors. Under information asymmetries, money managers do not fully optimize their portfolios of stocks. Their typical bias is to invest more in the familiar (Huberman, 2001) . 5 We assume that the prevailing principal-agent structure in money management does not prevent the bias of client investors from spilling over to the investments made by a money manager.
Over-investing in the familiar to their clients protects managers from poor performance since it is not viewed as lacking expertise. Based on this, we hypothesize that a money manager is biased towards 5 Huberman (2001) relies on Heath and Tversky's (1991) "competence hypothesis" to explain individual investor local bias.
firms that are familiar to her client investors (the agency-familiarity hypothesis). We measure investor familiarity with a firm by two variables: the total equity capitalization and the export ratio (export sales divided by total sales). Both of these firm variables are used in Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) . We are, however, cautious about the use of the export ratio because it may capture the difference in the composition of familiar firms between foreign and domestic investors.
It is known that money managers bias their portfolios for "window dressing" (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991) . They hedge the risk of receiving penalties such as losing contracts by investing in nice-looking firms. For example, Del Guercio (1996) documents that U.S.
mutual funds and banks significantly over-invest in prudent firm stocks with the prudence measured by firm's asset growth, profitability, and leverage. Further safeguards can be obtained through catering to the needs of the client investors in terms of particular investment styles, such as growth, value, or technology (Berberis and Shleifer, 2003) . The book-to-market ratio represents a standard value-growth investment style of firms' stocks.
We use these prudence and investment style measures along with familiarity variables to test the relative preference of domestic institutional investors under the agency-familiarity hypothesis.
Relational Distance Effect
Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Huberman (2001) provide evidence that relative distance from the location of firms is important in money managers' portfolio selection. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) assume that local money mangers are more informed than non-local counterparts on local firm activities. If there is another concept of distance in Japan, it should be a relational one. As discussed above, the closest possible institutional equity holdings in Japan are found in cross-shareholdings, on which the keiretsu and the main bank systems are built.
Japanese pension funds and investment trust (mutual) funds are more professionally managed due to the competition for fees, similar to other parts of the world. On the other hand, the others sub-category mostly lacks transparency, consisting of funds entrusted by governments, endowments, employees' saving plans, corporations, and wealthy individuals. 6 The important fact is that the managers of the others funds-mainly trust banks-are at the same time significant lenders in each major financial keiretsu. A keiretsu main bank usually coordinates a financial rescue as a part of implicit contracts in the main bank system (Aoki, Patric, and Sheard, 1994) . This may include share price support of a troubled member through money managers affiliated with the same keiretsu. Then, financially weak, otherwise failed member firms in the keiretsu may survive. We can identify that all zombies still surviving on the TSE1 were in financial keiretsu, where both banks' refusal to call loans and money managers' additional shareholdings helped their stock prices to be maintained above 50 yen (standard par price for many firms). 7 Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) demonstrate how the main bank arranges such a rescue involving other lending institutions. We focus on a different aspect of the rescue: if related through a financial keiretsu, money managers join the rescue by increasing their investment in troubled member firms. This represents the most essential part of "relational money management." 8 The relative over-investment by domestic institutional investors can be related to the distance (i.e., strength) of the relationship. However, a keiretsu relationship alone does not fully explain the over-investment in firms in the same keiretsu. We hypothesize that money managers' over-investment in related firms is conditioned on both the strength of rescue demand and the keiretsu ties. If these conditions are met, money managers in the same keiretsu increase their investment in the 6 See, for example, Asano (1996) . 7 For example, the foreign media Forbes (October 2002) acknowledges "In Japan, commonly used method to identify a zombie is to look for companies with a stock price worth less than 100 yen (about $1)." We identify all zombies surviving on the TSE1 were in financial keiretsu, where both banks' refusal to call loans and money managers' additional shareholdings helped their stock prices be maintained above 50 yen (standard par price for many firms).
related firms in trouble, using funds in the others sub-category. (Hiraki, Ito and Kuroki, 2004) . Notice that main banks in Japan have suffered from lowered credit ratings and increased credit default risk in their loan portfolios throughout the 1990s. Given this, the main bank may be the only buffer available for a firm against a possible default. Thus, financially weakened keiretsu firms can still survive while non-keiretsu troubled firms can not. This experimentally required condition is largely met throughout our sample period. We also use a few other alternative proxy variables for the bank loan ratio. First, the keiretsu dummy interacted with ROA or with the net worth ratio may be a reasonable proxy for the magnitude of rescue demand.
Second, the percentage ownership of corporate (cross-shareholding or main bank) investors may serve the same purpose.
Data and Methodology
Data
Our sample initially covered all firms on the TSE1 except for banks and other financial institutions, for the period from April 1985 to March 1999 (fiscal years 1985 to 1998 . 12 All investors not belonging to individual, foreign, or government categories are divided into the two groups: i) 12 Because of the regulatory change effective on April 1, 1999, the ownership information between 0.2 and one percent became publicly unavailable from the fiscal year 1999 on. Thus, we use the sample period through the end of fiscal year 1998 (March 31, 1999) . Notice the most precise data are required to accurately decompose the entire ownership held by each institution into the two components: portfolio investment and cross-shareholding portions.
corporate investors, including all cross-shareholdings and one-way shareholdings of financial institutions, and ii) domestic institutional investors. We remove the possible influence of foreign direct investments from our analysis by excluding those firms in which at least one identifiable foreign investor invests more than 15 percent of outstanding shares. 13 We further exclude regulated firms (i.e., broadcasting and transportation) with the upper limit applied to foreign ownership. Those firms involved in M&A transactions are also excluded from the sample for the event year. Lastly, we exclude those controlled more than 50 percent by the majority shareholders, i.e., the parents. This is because the floating portion of subsidiary firm's shares is significantly reduced relative to ordinary firms on the TSE1.
14 Appendix I.A shows breakdowns of firm ownership by investor category.
Because of the major disclosure rule change in Japan (see footnote 13), it is not possible to construct these (highly purified) ownership data beyond March 31, 1999, and the sample period in our study is therefore through the end of fiscal year 1998.
Our sample size (N = 938 on average and 1,013 in 1998) is smaller than that in Kang and Stulz (1997) (N = 1,439 in 1991) without firms on the TSE second section ("TSE2"). Our sample is truncated at zero percent and highly skewed right in foreign ownership distribution, even without smaller TSE2 firms which were basically ignored by foreign investors during our sample period (see partial evidence in Table 2 ). On the other hand, the ownership distribution for the other investor groups is closer to normal. Without TSE2 firms, our sample of firms might be subject to selection bias.
When we reject the null hypothesis that the foreign investor group is unbiased in firm size, our significant finding of positive size bias for foreign investors is interpreted as conservative.
Our initial dataset consisting of firm characteristic variables on an annual basis for all firms listed on the TSE1 for 1985-1998 is drawn from various sources: financial statements and stock price data of individual companies are from the Nikkei Needs Database; data on bank loans are from the Toyo Keizai and Nikkei Needs Databases. Ownership information for each sample firm is further refined through annual financial reports and formal attachments to the actual balance sheets of all exchange-listed firms in Japan. These attachments include detailed information on minority ownership interests with shareholder names and their percentage ownership. This information is particularly helpful for distinguishing foreign portfolio investments from foreign direct investments under foreign names.
Methodologies
We define the ownership bias (dependent) variable for the foreign investor group as follows:
where Fit Y is foreign investors' deviation from the benchmark for firm i in year t,
V is the market value of firm i's equity held by the foreign investors, that foreign investors invest in firm i more (less) than the benchmark suggests. For the other groups of investors (i.e., individual, corporate, and institutional), we similarly define each group's ownership deviation in firm i from the benchmark. We also compute the ownership deviation for each of the three sub-categories (mutual funds, pension funds, and others) of the entire domestic institutional investor group.
We then introduce the ownership difference measure of the foreign investor group from each of the variously classified domestic investor groups. For example, the ownership difference between foreign investors and domestic institutional investors in firm i at year t, Y F-Inst, it , is given by
where Y Inst it is institutional investors' ownership deviation from the benchmark with respect to firm i. The use of these ownership differences as a dependent variable enables us to investigate ownership bias of the foreign investor group relative to the other domestic investor groups, and vice versa.
Our typical regression specification is expressed as: As for the firm characteristic variables, we use the log market value of firm's total equity shares outstanding and the export ratio (export sales divided by total sales) to measure the investor familiarity. The average annual asset growth rate over the past three years, ROA (net profit divided by total assets), and the net worth ratio (net worth divided by total assets) are used to capture firm's prudence. We use the book-to-market ratio of firm's equity as a measure of the popular value-growth investment style and the main bank dummy as a corporate governance index. Finally, the annual turnover ratio of stocks (annual transaction volume divided by the number of total shares outstanding) is used as a liquidity proxy of firm's stocks. We use three major sector classifications: the material goods sector, processed goods sector, and services sector. Thus, we apply two sector dummy variables corresponding to the materials and the processed goods sector. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of these characteristic variables.
[ Table 2 about here]
We apply a pooled regression analysis to the unbalanced multiple-year data with fixed-effect yearly dummy variables. 16 The regression models are estimated for various combinations of the explanatory variables and for both the entire and the two equally divided sub-periods. Although this selection of two sub-periods does not exactly match with the timing of the Tokyo market bubble crash at the end of 1989, it is sufficient to see the change of behavioral patterns of each investor group over time. Notice that domestic investors are continuously optimistic well beyond the crash in the Tokyo market (Shiller, Kon-ya, and Tsutsui, 1996) . Table 3 shows how foreign investors rapidly increased their equity market share in Japan.
Empirical Results
Preliminary Analysis of Investor Bias
The size orientation ratio used in the table is defined as the value-weighted average relative to the arithmetic average of percent ownership for each investor group. Foreign investors are clearly more size oriented than domestic institutions, especially in more recent years. Reported at the bottom, both mutual and pension funds show a lower degree of large-firm orientation than foreign investors' except that in 1985.
[ Tables 3, 4 and 5 about here] Table 4 shows the correlation structure of the firm characteristic variables used in this study.
Each correlation in the table represents the average cross-sectional correlation over the entire sample period. The firm size is positively correlated with all variables other than the main bank dummy and
the book-to-market ratio. Its highest correlation is with ROA at 0.28, while the correlation with the export ratio is modest at 0.17. The firm performance represented by asset growth or ROA is strongly correlated with the net worth ratio and the main bank dummy variable. The correlations between ROA and the net worth ratio and between the net worth ratio and the main bank dummy are 0.32 and -0.46, respectively. The rest of correlations are relatively low. Overall, large, low-leveraged firms tend to operationally and financially outperform small firms that borrow more. In 1998, their preference changes and becomes similar to that of foreign investors in all three prudence measures.
Regression Analysis Bias Analysis for Each Investor Group
Various combinations of the independent variables were tested first for the foreign investor group to determine the baseline regression model. The baseline model selected includes all variables listed in Table 2 in addition to the yearly and industry dummy variables. Table 6 documents the baseline regression results for each of the four major groups of investors.
[ Table 6 about here]
The foreign investor group (k = 1) significantly and persistently over-invests in large-capitalization firms. This group also significantly over-invests in export-oriented firms and does so more in the second sub-period. The positive effect of all prudence and turnover variables is also statistically significant. In addition, there is evidence that foreign investors under-invest in firms with a main bank feature. Overall, the regression results for foreign investors are consistent with the Japanese evidence reported by Kang and Stulz (1997) .
The individual investor group (k = 2) does not show much bias except for their strong small-firm orientation across the sample period. Their significant and negative response to the firm size is somewhat puzzling in an information context. Not surprisingly, the ownership responses of the corporate investors (k = 3) to all size, liquidity, and prudence variables are negative and mostly significant across the panel.
The domestic institutional investor group (k = 4), as a whole, consistently over-invests in larger firms, similar to the foreign investor group. This group also over-invests in high-turnover firms, especially in the first sub-period. Their overall under-investment in export-oriented firms is caused by a combination of the positive but insignificant response in the first sub-period and the negative and significant response in the second sub-period. Their ownership responses to the prudence variables are most interesting. Domestic institutional investors indeed do not invest in prudent firms at all, significantly over-investing in low ROA and in highly leveraged firms during the first sub-period. In fact, domestic institutional investors are more similar to corporate investors than to foreign investors, especially during the first sub-period. They were likely rescuing financially weak "large" firms.
In the second sub-period, domestic institutional investors seems to have changed to prudent investors, as shown in their significant and positive responses to the asset growth and net worth ratios.
This may be attributed, first, to a series of deregulations in the 1990s, second, to the decrease in client investors' tolerance for poor performance, 18 and, third, to the investor's deferred formation of pessimism in the later 1990s (Shiller et al., 1996) .
The response to the main bank dummy variable shows an overall insignificant justification for extra share holdings of the foreign and other investor classes, except for those of the corporate 18 The Japanese equity mutual funds have consistently and dramatically under-performed any risk-adjusted benchmarks (see Cai, Chan and Yamada, 1997, for combined reasons; and Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Otsuki, and Shiraishi, 2001 , for a tax reason). This may indicate that there exists a required structure (i.e., a very high level of investor tolerance to poor performance) for imprudent investment by money managers in Japan. Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, and Shiraishi (2003) , however, reveal that there is some performance improvement among the same domestic equity mutual fund managers investor group. The result is consistent with the more recent view on the main bank system provided by Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) , Kang and Shivdasani (1999) , and Hiraki et al. (2003) . Notice that banks are included in the corporate investor group in our study. Table 7 shows the ownership response to the export ratio for the foreign (panel A) and domestic (panel B) institutional investor groups, estimated by dividing the sample into different industry sectors. The pervasive export orientation of foreign investors, more significant in the second sub-period, is contributed to not only by the machinery/processed goods sector, but also by the materials and services sectors, as shown in panel A.
Export Ratio Sensitivity of Money Managers
[ Table 7 about here]
The time-varying response pattern of domestic institutional investors to the export ratio is shown in panel B. Their significant and negative response in the second sub-period represents the net effect of the significant positive effect in the processed goods sector and the continuously significant and negative effect in the materials sector. It is interesting to note that domestic institutional investors are export-oriented even in the sector(s) more populated by export-oriented firms. The export ratio is a common preference attribute of the firm in the processed goods sector for both foreign and domestic institutional investors. The others sub-category significantly over-invests in less prudent firms during the first sub-period, while mutual funds and pension funds over-invest in prudent firms in each of the two sub-periods.
Breaking Down Domestic Institutional Investor Group
The imprudence of the others sub-category in the net worth ratio disappears and this sub-group becomes a prudent investor overall during the second sub-period.
[ Tables 8 & 9 about here]
In Table 9 , the relative ownership responses to the foreign investor group are provided for the domestic institutional investor group (k = 7) and for each of the three sub-category groups: mutual funds (k = 7.1), pension funds (k = 7.2), and the others (k = 7.3). 20 Again, we observe that the others sub-category is much more deviated from the foreign investor group than mutual and pension funds in prudence. A similar result holds for the entire domestic institutional investor group. The overall result in Table 9 suggests that foreign and domestic institutional investors do not much converge into a single category of money managers in Japan, and that the relative imprudence differs between the more transparent (pension and investment trust) funds and the less transparent (others) funds within the domestic institutional investor group. Table 10 , panel A, shows the result when the bank loan-to-total-asset ratio is included as an additional explanatory variable in the baseline regression for domestic institutional investors (k = 4).
Tests of the Relational Effect
Its coefficient is positive and statistically significant across the sample period. Thus, the result is consistent with the relational distance hypothesis. Further, the coefficient of the net worth ratio changes from the insignificant and negative (in Table 6 ) to the significant and positive value over the sub-periods (in Table 10 ). With respect to firms' financial risk, domestic institutional investors prefer prudence after controlling for the relational distance interacted with the firm need for stock price protection. However, statistically significant imprudence still remains with respect to ROA during the first-half sample at the five-percent level.
[ Tables 10 & 11 about We conducted the same analyses for the others sub-category (k = 4.3) of domestic institutional investors. The result is the most significant and consistent with our relational distance hypothesis. 21 The relational distance hypothesis is empirically validated for domestic institutional investors, especially for the others sub-category of domestic institutional investors. However, their over-investment in unrelated imprudent firms is also found to be positive and significant during the first sub-period. In the case of government PKOs, mainly implemented in the first sub-period, domestic money managers are not much restricted by their keiretsu membership, but still restricted by their relations with the government. 21 The results for k=4.3 are available upon request.
Conclusions
Overall, our findings on institutional investor behavior are consistent with each of the proposed hypotheses. The strong preference of both foreign and domestic institutional investors for large capitalization firms is consistent with the agency-familiarity hypothesis. The common institutional investor bias proposed by Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) is only partially supported by the Japanese data. The most important difference exists in an asymmetric ownership response to the firm prudence variables. The over-investment in financially weak keiretsu member firms is only found for the domestic institutional investor group. The relational investment by domestic institutional investors is similar to rescue loans provided by a keiretsu main bank. The previous studies, including Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) , Kang and Shivdasani (1999) , and Hiraki et al. (2003) , have focused on the central role of main banks in keiretsu and found that the system is rather inefficient. This study, on the other hand, focuses on the role played by keiretsu-affiliated money management as another source of weak corporate governance in Japan.
The relational equity investment may distort portfolio selection of domestic institutional investors. As suggested by Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, and Shiraishi (2003), we do not believe that Japanese domestic money managers are incompetent in comparison to foreign-affiliated domestic money managers. But, investment performance clearly differs between these two groups (see also Kamesaka, Nofsinger, and Kawakita, 2003) . The constraints faced by domestic institutional investors might be at least a partial cause of their overall poorer performance. Iihara, Kato, and Tokunaga (2002) show negative herding of Japanese domestic institutional investors with foreign investors across all size categories. They also show that domestic institutions are contrarians to increase their portfolio portion of firms that fall in value. We additionally document that generally imprudent domestic institutions later change to prudent investors, except for rescuing keiretsu members in trouble. We also provide one possible reason why Japanese institutional investors look like extreme contrarians, especially, during our first sub-sample period. We think that this is mostly due to their keiretsu constraint. The others sub-category of domestic institutional investors seems to function as a life-prolonging device for zombie member firms.
In our future work, we will use more detailed data on asset compositions in each institutional account to more directly test whether aggregate imprudent investments are indeed closely related to the over-investment by each specific money manager affiliated with a particular financial keiretsu.
APPENDIX I
A. Definitions of Equity Investor Groups: The firms excluded are tabulated below. In addition to these firms, all banks are excluded from the sample in this study. Group 1985 Group 1986 Group 1987 Group 1988 Group 1989 Group 1990 Group 1991 Group 1992 Group 1993 Group 1994 Group 1995 Group 1996 Group 1997 Table 1 Total Table 3 Equal-weighted, Value-Weighted Average, and Size Orientation for Each of the Four Investor Groups: 1985 Groups: , 1990 Groups: , 1995 Groups: , and 1998 Groups: 1985 Groups: (N=843) 1990 1995 (N=978) Table 9 Pooled Regressions for Foreign Investors' Relative to Domestic Institutional Investors (k = 7), Mutual Funds (k = 7.1), Pension Funds (k = 7.2) and Others (k = 7. 3)
Industry/ Year
The estimates for the constant and sector dummy variables are not reported. White's (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity is used for t-values. **(*) Statistically significant at the one (five) percent level. Period 1985 -1998 1985 1992 -1998 Period 985-1998 1985 1992 -1998 Period 985-1998 1985 1992 -1998 
